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Abstract—In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive
study of user-chosen 4- and 6-digit PINs (n = 1220) collected
on smartphones with participants being explicitly primed for
device unlocking. We find that against a throttled attacker (with
10, 30, or 100 guesses, matching the smartphone unlock setting),
using 6-digit PINs instead of 4-digit PINs provides little to no
increase in security, and surprisingly may even decrease security.
We also study the effects of blacklists, where a set of “easy to
guess” PINs is disallowed during selection. Two such blacklists
are in use today by iOS, for 4-digits (274 PINs) as well as 6-
digits (2910 PINs). We extracted both blacklists compared them
with four other blacklists, including a small 4-digit (27 PINs), a
large 4-digit (2740 PINs), and two placebo blacklists for 4- and
6-digit PINs that always excluded the first-choice PIN. We find
that relatively small blacklists in use today by iOS offer little
or no benefit against a throttled guessing attack. Security gains
are only observed when the blacklists are much larger, which
in turn comes at the cost of increased user frustration. Our
analysis suggests that a blacklist at about 10 % of the PIN space
may provide the best balance between usability and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
We provide the first study focused on the selection of Per-
sonal Identification Numbers (PINs) based on data collected
from users specifically primed for the smartphone setting.
While authentication on mobile devices has been studied in
several contexts, including patterns [39] and passwords [28],
little is known about PINs used for mobile authentication.
Despite the rise of biometrics, such as fingerprint or facial
recognition, devices still require PINs, e.g., after a restart or
when the biometric fails. That is because biometric authentica-
tion does not replace knowledge-based authentication; access
to a device is still possible with a PIN even when using a
biometric. Moreover, the presence of a biometric may actually
lead to a false sense of security when selecting knowledge-
based authenticators [14].
Our study focuses on the PINs users choose to unlock their
mobile devices. Previous work on PINs was primarily focused
on the context of banking, e.g., as part of the Chip-and-PIN
system [11] and also mainly relied on the analysis of digit
sequences found in leaked text-based password datasets since
this data is more readily available [46].
Given the sparsity of explicit information about PINs in the
context of mobile unlock authentication, we sought to fill this
vital knowledge gap by conducting the first study (n = 1220)
on the topic where participants either selected a 4- or 6-digit
PIN, the two predominant PIN lengths used for device unlock.
In addition to only allowing participants to complete the study
on a smartphone, we also primed our participants specifically
for the mobile unlock authentication setting, reminding them
that the selected “PIN protects [their] data and is used to
unlock [their] smartphone.” While our study cannot speak to
memorability of selected PINs due to the short time duration,
our qualitative feedback suggests that participants took this
prompt seriously and selected relevant PINs.
PINs of 4 and 6 digits only provide security when paired
with system controls like lockouts and delays that limit offline
(or unthrottled) guessing. An unthrottled attacker who can
bypass these controls can quickly guess all PIN combinations.
We instead consider a throttled attacker model to empirically
analyze the security of PINs when the system limits the
guessing rate. This is usual in the smartphone-unlocking
setting where pauses are enforced after a certain number of
wrong guesses in order to slow attacks down. Guessing is then
limited (or throttled) to, e.g., just 10, 30, or 100 attempts in a
reasonable time window, such as a few hours.
In such a model, it is essential to prioritize guessing
resistance in the first few guesses. Our study found little benefit
to longer 6-digit PINs as compared to 4-digit PINs. In fact,
our participants tend to select more-easily guessed 6-digit PINs
when considering the first 40 guesses of an attacker.
As a mechanism for improving PIN selection, we also
studied how PINs are affected by blacklisting. A blacklist is a
set of “easy to guess” PINs, which triggers a warning to the
user. Apple iOS devices show the warning “This PIN Can Be
Easily Guessed” with a choice to “Use Anyway” or “Change
PIN.” Previous work in text-based passwords has shown that
users choose stronger passwords due to a blacklist [24], [36],
and recent guidance from NIST [20] concurs.
To understand selection strategies in the presence of a
blacklist, we conducted a between-subjects comparison of PIN
selection using a number of different blacklists. This included
one small (27 4-digit PINs), one large (2740 4-digit PINs), and
two blacklists (274 4-digit PINs and 2910 6-digit PINs) in use
today on iOS devices, which we extracted for this purpose.
To determine if the experience of hitting a blacklist or the
content of the blacklist itself drives the result, we included
a placebo blacklist that always excluded the participants’ first
choice. Finally, we included both enforcing and non-enforcing
blacklists, where participants were able to “click through” and
ignore the blacklist, the approach taken by iOS.
Despite the popularity of blacklists and the positive impact
on textual passwords, our results show that currently employed
PIN blacklists are ineffective against a throttled attacker, in
both the enforcing and non-enforcing setting. This attacker
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performs nearly as well at guessing 4-digit PINs as if there
were no blacklist in use. To be effective, the blacklist would
need to be much larger, leading to higher user frustration. Our
results show that a blacklist of about 10 % of the PIN space
may be able to balance the security and usability needs.
Finally, we collected both quantitative and qualitative feed-
back from our participants about their PIN selection strategies,
perceptions of their PINs in the context of blacklists, and
their thoughts about blacklisting generally. Overall, we find
that despite having mostly negative sentiments about blacklist
warnings, participants do perceive the PINs they select under
a blacklist as more secure without impacting the memorability
and convenience, except in situations of a very large blacklist.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
1) We report on the security of 4- and 6-digit PINs as
measured for smartphone unlocking, finding that in the
throttled setting, the benefit of 6-digit PINs is marginal
and sometimes worse than that of 4-digit PINs.
2) Considering a realistic, throttled attacker model, we show
how different blacklisting approaches influence PIN se-
lection process for both security and usability, finding that
blacklists in use today offer little to no added security.
3) Through quantitative and qualitative feedback, we explore
users’ perception of security, memorability, and ease-of-
use of PIN-based authentication, finding that participants
perceive that blacklisting will improve their PINs without
impacting usability, except for very large blacklists.
4) We provide guidance for developers on choosing an
appropriately-sized PIN blacklist that can influence the
security in the throttled scenario, finding that a 4-digit
PIN blacklist needs to be about 10 % of the key space to
have a noticeable impact.
Note: We responsibly disclosed all our findings to Apple Inc.
II. RELATED WORK
Research on PIN authentication for mobile devices is related
to the larger area of mobile authentication. User preferences
for different unlock methods for Android devices were studied
by Harbach et al. [22] in 2014. Since then, PINs have found
new uses in encrypting mobile devices [3], [5], [30] and
biometrics [14] which require a PIN as part of the keying
material and for fallback authentication when biometrics fail.
The work most closely related to this research is the
analysis of PINs in the context of Chip-and-PIN systems
done by Bonneau et al. [11], where they considered 4-digit
PIN creation strategies for banking customers for use with
ATMs/credit cards. Bonneau et al. identified techniques used
for selecting PINs, where choosing (birth) dates/years was the
most popular—also true in our setting. As noted, an attacker
can leverage the skewed distribution of PIN choices to improve
the guessing strategy. As a countermeasure, Bonneau et al.
proposed the use of a blacklist containing the 100 most popular
PINs. From our analysis, it seems that their suggestion may
have formed the basis for Apple iOS’s 4-digit blacklist.
Our work differs from Bonneau et al. in two significant
ways. Foremost, Bonneau et al. were primarily concerned with
payment cards, not smartphone unlock authentication. Second,
Bonneau et al. did not collect new PINs but instead relied on
digit sequences found in leaked passwords along with PINs
collected without the benefit of a controlled experiment [2].
Our research aims for greater ecological validity by specifi-
cally priming users for this task. Our data further suggests that
using password leaks may be an imperfect approximation for
how users choose PINs for unlock authentication.
Wang et al. [46] have also analyzed the security of PINs –
in this case without any specific usage context. They report on
comparing 4- and 6-digit PINs created by English and Chinese
users. One counter-intuitive finding is that 6-digit PINs are less
resistant to online attacks, despite the key space expansion
from 4- to 6-digit PINs. Our results support the observation
that in a rate limited guessing scenario there may actually be
no benefit of using 6-digit PINs at all and in certain cases
security even decreases. Yet, Wang et al. used PINs extracted
from leaked, text-based password datasets whereas we tend
to increase the ecological validity of our results by collecting
new PINs specifically primed for mobile authentication and
the smartphone form-factor with its standard PIN layout.
Blacklists have been considered in the context of PINs by
Kim et al. [25]. They tested blacklists for both 4-digit as well
as 6-digit PINs, and concluded that a reasonably-sized blacklist
could indeed increase the security. Kim et al. used Shannon en-
tropy and guessing entropy as the strength metric and thus only
consider an unthrottled, perfect knowledge attacker that will
exhaustively guess the PIN space [10]. This is a questionable
attacker model especially given the sparsity of their dataset.
Kim et al. compared blacklists representing 2 % and 32 %
of the possible PIN space and found the large blacklist led
to lower Shannon-entropy and lower offline guessing-entropy
PINs, perhaps due to the composition of Kim et al.’s large
blacklist. In contrast, we show that with a more realistic rate-
limited, online attacker, a larger blacklist containing 27.4 % of
all possible PINs provides a benefit over a smaller one that
blacklists only 2.7 %, differing from the suggestion of Kim et
al. regarding the effect of the size of the blacklist.
Beyond PINs, another common knowledge-based mo-
bile authentication mechanism are Android unlock patterns,
whereby a user selects a pattern that connects points on a
3x3 grid. Uellenbeck et al. [39] showed that user selection of
unlock patterns is highly biased, e.g., most patterns start in the
upper left corner. These results have been confirmed by other
works [6], [27], [45]. Most relevant to our study, we compare
the security of mobile unlock PINs to that of patterns and have
obtained datasets from related work [6], [27], [39], [45].
While less common, according to Harbach et al. [22] and
our own measurement (see Table IV), alphanumeric passwords
are another option for users to unlock their mobile devices.
For this reason, we also consider alphanumeric passwords in
our comparisons with PINs, as available in leaked, text-based
password datasets. Research has shown that the creation and
use of passwords on mobile devices can be cumbersome and
users may create weaker passwords than they would do on
full-sized keyboards [21], [28], [35], [44], [49].
TABLE I
DATASETS FOR STRENGTH ESTIMATIONS AND COMPARISONS.
Kind Dataset Samples Use
4-digit PINs Amitay-4-digit [2] 204 432 Strength
6-digit PINs RockYou-6-digit [46] 2 758 490 Strength
4-digit PINs RockYou-4-digit [46] 1 780 587 Comparison
Unlock patterns “All” – 3x3 patterns [17] 4 637 Comparison
Passwords LinkedIn [19] 10 000 Comparison
Passwords Pwned Passwords v4 [23] Top 10 000 Comparison
III. BACKGROUND
A. Attacker Model
When studying guessing attackers, there are two primary
threat models. An unthrottled attacker can guess offline, indef-
initely, until all the secrets are correctly guessed, while a throt-
tled attacker is limited in the number of guesses, sometimes
called an online attack. Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS, the
two most popular mobile operating systems, implement real-
world rate limiting mechanisms to throttle attackers because
otherwise, it would be possible to simply guess all PIN
combinations. In our attacker model, we assume the rate-
limiting works as designed, and as such, it is appropriate to
consider a throttled attacker when evaluating security as this
best matches the reality of the attacks PINs must sustain for
the mobile unlock setting.
The choice of the throttled attack model is further justified
when considering mobile devices’ trusted execution environ-
ments (TEE), where the key for device encryption is stored
in “tamper resistant” hardware and is “entangled” with the
user’s unlock secret [5]. This forces the attacker to perform
decryption (unlock) attempts on the device itself in an online
way. Moreover, the TEE is used to throttle the number of
decryption attempts tremendously by enforcing rate limiting
delays which also survive reboots.1
An overview of the currently enforced limits is given in
Table II. Apple’s iOS is very restrictive and only allows up to
10 guesses [5] before the iPhone disables itself and requires a
reset. Google’s Android version 7 or newer are less restrictive
with a first notable barrier at 30 guesses where the waiting
time increases by 10 minutes. We define the upper bound
for a reasonably invested throttled attacker at 100 guesses
when the waiting starts to exceed a time span of 10 hours
on Android [4], but we also report results for less determined
attackers at 10 guesses (30 s) and 30 guesses (10.5 m) for
Android. The iOS limit is 10 guesses (1.5 h) [5].
In our attacker model, we assume that the adversary has
no background information about the owner of the device
or access to other side-channels. In such a scenario, the
best approach for an attacker is to guess the user’s PIN in
decreasing probability order. To derive this order, we rely on
1While there are tools by Cellebrite [13] and GrayShift [12] that exploit
vulnerabilities in an attempt to escalate guessing to an unthrottled attacker,
we consider such attacks out of scope. These exploits are usually bound to a
specific device or OS version or can only be run within certain timeframes
(e.g., 1 hour) after the last successful unlock [47].
TABLE II
RATE LIMITING ON MOBILE OPERATING SYSTEMS.
To Make n Accumulated Waiting Time
Guesses Android 7, 8, 9, 10 iOS 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
1-5 guesses 0 s 0 s
6 guesses 30 s 1 m 0 s
7 guesses 30 s 6 m 0 s
8 guesses 30 s 21 m 0 s
9 guesses 30 s 36 m 0 s
10 guesses 30 s 1 h 36 m 0 s
30 guesses 10 m 30 s -
100 guesses 10 h 45 m 30 s -
200 guesses 67 d 2 h 45 m 30 s -
the best available PIN datasets, which are the Amitay-4-digit
and RockYou-6-digit datasets as defined below. Again, we only
consider an un-targeted attacker who does not have additional
information about the victim being attacked. If the attacker
is targeted, and is able to use other information and context
about the victim, e.g., via shoulder-surfing attack [35], [7],
[9] or screen smudges [8], the attacker would have significant
advantages, particularly in guessing 4- vs. 6-digit PINs [9].
In other parts of this work, we make use of blacklists. In
those cases, we consider an attacker that is aware and in
possession of the blacklist. This is because the attacker can
crawl the system’s blacklist on a sample device, as we have
done for this work. Hence, with knowledge of the blacklist,
an informed attacker can improve the guessing strategy by
not guessing known blacklisted PINs and instead focusing on
common PINs not on the blacklist.
B. Datasets
Perhaps the most realistic 4-digit PIN data is from 2011
where Daniel Amitay developed the iOS application “Big
Brother Camera Security” [2]. The app mimicked a lock screen
allowing users to set a 4-digit PIN. Amitay anonymously and
surreptitiously collected 204 432 4-digit PINs and released
them publicly [2]. While collected in an uncontrolled exper-
iment, we apply the dataset (Amitay-4-digit) when guessing
4-digit PINs, as well as to inform the selection of our “data-
driven” blacklists.
As there is no similar 6-digit PIN data available to in-
form the attacker, we rely on 6-digit PINs extracted from
password leaks, similar to Bonneau et al.’s [11] and Wang
et al.’s [46] method. PINs are extracted from consecutive
sequences of exactly n-digits in leaked password data. For
example, if a password contains a sequence of digits of the
desired length, this sequence is considered as a PIN (e.g., PW:
ab3c123456d → PIN: 123456, but no 6-digit PINs would
be extracted from the sequence ab3c1234567d).
By following this method, we extracted 6-digit PINs from
the RockYou password leak, which we refer to as RockYou-
6-digit (2 758 490 PINs). We also considered 6-digit PINs
extracted from other password leaks, such as the LinkedIn [19]
dataset, but found no marked differences between the datasets.
To provide more comparison points, we consider a number
of other authentication datasets listed in Table I. For example,
we use a 3x3 Android unlock pattern dataset described by
Golla et al. [17], combining four different datasets [6], [27],
[39], [45]. It consists of 4637 patterns with 1635 of those being
unique. In addition, we use a text-password dataset. Melicher
et al. [28] found no difference in strength between passwords
created on mobile and traditional devices considering a throt-
tled guessing attacker. Thus, we use a random sample of
10 000 passwords from the LinkedIn [19] leak and use the
Pwned Passwords v4 [23] list to simulate a throttled guessing
attacker to estimate the guessing resistance for the sampled
LinkedIn passwords as a proxy for mobile text passwords.
C. Extracting the iOS Blacklists
As part of our set of blacklists, we also consider a blacklist
of “easily guessed” 4/6-digit PINs as used in the wild by
Apple, which we obtained via brute-force extraction from
an iPhone running iOS 12. We were able to verify that
blacklisting of PINs is present on iOS 9 throughout the latest
version iOS 13, and we also discovered that Apple updated
their blacklist with the deployment of iOS 10 (e.g., the PIN
101471 is blacklisted on iOS 10.3.3, but is not on iOS 9.3.5).
In theory, it is possible to extract the blacklist by reverse
engineering iOS, yet, we found a more direct way to determine
the blacklist via brute-force: During device setup, when a PIN
is first chosen, there is no throttling. To test the membership
of a PIN, one only needs to enter all the PINs and observe the
presence of the blacklist warning, and then intentionally fail
to re-enter the PIN to be able to start over. We constructed a
device to automate this process using a Raspberry Pi Zero W
equipped with a Pi Camera Module (8MP), as depicted in
Figure 1. The Raspberry Pi emulates a USB keyboard, which
is connected to the iPhone. After entering a PIN, the camera of
the Raspberry Pi takes a photo of the iPhone screen. The photo
is sent to a remote server, where it is converted to grayscale
and thresholded using OpenCV. Subsequently, the presence of
the blacklist warning, as depicted in Figure 4, is detected by
extracting the text in the photo using Tesseract OCR.
The extraction of all 10 000 4-digit PINs took ∼ 9 hours.
Testing all 1 million 6-digit PINs took about 30 days using two
setups in parallel. To ensure accuracy, we repeated the process
for 4-digit PINs multiple times, tested lists of frequent 6-digit
PINs, and verified the patterns found in the PINs. Moreover,
we validated all blacklisted PINs multiple times. We refer to
these two lists as the iOS-4 and iOS-6 blacklists. 2
In total, the 4-digit blacklist contains 274 PINs and includes
common PINs as well as years from 1956 to 2015, but its
composition is mostly driven by repetitions such as aaaa,
abab, or aabb. The 6-digit blacklist contains 2910 PINs and
includes common PINs as well as ascending and descending
digits (e.g., 543210), but its composition is, again, mostly
driven by repetitions such as aaaaaa, abcabc, or abccba.
The common PINs blacklisted by Apple overlap with a 4-digit
blacklist suggested by Bonneau et al. [11] in 2012 and the top
6-digit PINs reported by Wang et al. [46] in 2017.
2To foster future research on this topic, we share the described blacklists
and the PIN datasets at: https://this-pin-can-be-easily-guessed.github.io
Fig. 1. The installation used to extract the iOS blacklists.
IV. USER STUDY
In this section, we outline the specifics of the treatment
conditions, the user study protocol, and the collected data. We
will also discuss any limitations of the study as well as ethical
considerations. Please refer to Appendix A for the specific
wording and layouts of the questions.
A. Study Protocol and Design
We conducted a user study of 4- and 6-digit PINs using
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with n = 1220 participants
over a period of three weeks. To mimic the PIN creation
process in our browser-based study, participants were restricted
to mobile devices by checking the user-agent string.
We applied a 9-treatment, between-subjects study protocol
for the PIN selection criteria, e.g., 4- vs. 6-digit with or without
blacklisting. The specifics of the treatments are discussed in
detail in Section IV-B. At the end of the study, we collected
851 and 369 PINs, 4- and 6-digits respectively, for a total
of 1220 PINs as our core dataset. These PINs were all
selected, confirmed, and recalled. We additionally recorded
all intermediate PIN selections, such as what would happen if
a selected PIN was not blacklisted and the participant did not
have to select a different PIN. For more details of different
kinds of PINs collected and analyzed, refer to Table VI.
All participants were exposed to a set of questions and
feedback prompts that gauged the security, memorability, and
usability of their selected PINs, as well as their attitudes
towards blacklisting events during PIN selection.
The survey itself consists of 10 parts. Within each part, to
avoid ordering effects, we applied randomization to the order
of the questions that may inform later ones; this information
is also available in Appendix A. The parts of the survey are:
1) Informed Consent: All participants were informed of the
procedures of the survey and had to provide consent. The
informed consent notified participants that they would be
required to select PINs in different treatments, but did not
inform them of any details about blacklisting that might
be involved in that selection.
2) Agenda: After being informed, participants were provided
additional instructions and details in the form of an
agenda. It stated the following: “You will be asked to
complete a short survey that requires you to select a
numeric PIN and then answer some questions about it
afterwards. You contribute to research so please answer
correctly and as detailed as possible.”
3) Practice: Next, participants practiced with the PIN entry
screen, which mimics typical PIN selection on mobile de-
vices, including the “phoneword” alphabet on the virtual
PIN pad. The purpose of the practice round was to ensure
that participants were familiar with the interface prior to
selecting a PIN. There was clear indication during the
practice round that this was practice and that participants
would begin the primary survey afterwards.
4) Priming: After familiarization and before selection, par-
ticipants were further primed about mobile unlock au-
thentication and PINs using language similar to what iOS
and Android use during PIN selection. A visual of the
priming is in Figure 2. A lock icon was used to prime
notions of security, and users were reminded that they
will need to remember their PIN for the duration of the
study without writing it down. Participants must click “I
understand” to continue. The qualitative feedback shows
that the priming was understood and followed with some
participants even stating that they reused their actual PIN.
5) Creation: The participants then performed the PIN cre-
ation on the page shown in Figure 3. The PIN was entered
by touching the digits on the virtual PIN pad. As usual,
users had to enter the PIN a second time to confirm it
was entered correctly. Depending on the treatment (see
Section IV-B), the users either selected a 4- or 6-digit PIN
and did or did not experience a blacklist event. In Figure 4
and Figure 5 we depicted the two blacklist warnings
which either allowed participants to “click through” the
warning (or not). The feedback was copied to directly
mimic the wording and layout of a blacklist warning used
by Apple since iOS 12.
6) Blacklisting Followup: After creation, we asked partici-
pants about their attitudes and strategies with blacklisting.
If the participants experienced a blacklist event, we
referred back to that event in asking followup questions.
Otherwise, we asked participants to “imagine” such an
experience. These questions form the heart of our quali-
tative analysis (see Section VI-F).
7) PIN Selection Followup: We asked a series of questions
to gauge participants’ attitudes towards the PIN they
selected with respect to its security and usability, where
usability was appraised based on ease of entry and mem-
orability (see Section VI-E). As part of this questionnaire,
we also asked an attention check question. We excluded
the data of 12 participants because we could not guarantee
that they followed our instructions completely.
8) Recall: On this page, participants were asked to recall
their earlier selected PIN. Although the two prior parts
formed distractor tasks we do not expect that the recall
rates measured here speak broadly for the memorability
of these PINs. As expected, nearly all participants could
recall their selected PIN.
9) Demographics: In line with best practice [32], we col-
lected the demographics of the participants at the very
end, including age, gender, IT background, and their
current mobile unlock authentication.
10) Honesty/Submission: Finally, we asked if the participants
provided “honest” answers to the best of their ability. We
informed them that they would be paid even if they indi-
cated dishonesty. Using this information in combination
with the attention check described above, we excluded
the data of 12 participants to ensure the integrity of our
data. After affirming honesty (or dishonesty), the survey
concluded and was submitted.
B. Treatments
We used 9 different treatments: 6 treatments for 4-digit
PINs and 3 treatments for 6-digit PINs. The naming and
description of each treatment can be found in Table III, as
well as the number of participants (non-overlapping, between-
subjects) exposed to each treatment.
1) Control Treatments: For each PIN length, we had a
control treatment, Control-4-digit and Control-6-digit, that
simply primed participants for mobile unlock authentication
and asked them to select a PIN without any blacklist in-
teraction. These PINs form the basis of our 4- and 6-digit
mobile-authentication primed PIN dataset. In total, we have
231 control 4-digit PINs and 127 control 6-digit PINs. We
decided to have a larger sample of 4-digit PINs to better
validate our methodology compared to other datasets.
We sometimes refer to two datasets, First-Choice-4-digit
and First-Choice-6-digit. These combine the control PINs
with those chosen by participants from other treatments in their
“first attempt” before having been subjected to any blacklist.
The First-Choice-4-digit dataset contains 851 4-digit PINs
while First-Choice-6-digit consists of 369 6-digit PINs.
2) Blacklist Treatments: The remaining treatments consid-
ered PIN selection in the presence of a blacklist. There are
two types of blacklist implementations: enforcing and non-
enforcing. An enforcing blacklist does not allow to continue
as long as the selected PIN is blacklisted; the user must select
a non-blacklisted PIN. A non-enforcing blacklist warns the
user that the selection is blacklisted, but the user can choose
to ignore the feedback and proceed anyway. We describe
this treatment as providing the participant an option to click
through. Otherwise, the treatment uses an enforcing blacklist.
Visuals of the non-enforcing and enforcing feedback can be
found in Figure 4 and 5, respectively.
a) Placebo Blacklist: As we wanted to determine if the
experience of hitting a blacklist or the content of the blacklist
itself drive the results, we included a placebo treatment for
both 4- and 6-digit PINs (Placebo-4-digit and Placebo-6-
digit, respectively). In this treatment, the user’s first choice
PIN was blacklisted, forcing a second choice. As long as the
second choice differed from the first, it was accepted.
b) iOS Blacklist: For this treatment, we included the
blacklists used on Apple’s iOS 12. The 4-digit iOS blacklist
contains 274 PINs (2.74 % of the available 4-digit PINs), and
Fig. 2. Priming information provided before
the participants were asked to create a PIN.
Fig. 3. The design of the page on which we
asked the participants to create a PIN.
Fig. 4. Blacklist warning with the ability to
“click through.”
Fig. 5. Blacklist warning without the ability
to “click through.”
the 6-digit iOS blacklist contains 2910 PINs (0.291 % of the
available 6-digit PINs). These blacklists provide measurements
of real scenarios for users selecting PINs on iOS devices.
As iOS allows users to “click through” the blacklist warning
and use their blacklisted PIN anyway, we implemented our
blacklisting for the iOS condition in the same way (i.e., con-
ditions iOS-4-digit-wCt and iOS-6-digit-wCt). To understand
the effect of non-enforcing blacklists, we also had an enforcing
version of the iOS blacklist for 4-digits (iOS-4-digit-nCt).
c) Data-Driven Blacklists: We considered two 4-digit
blacklists that are significantly (10x) smaller (27 PINs) and
(10x) larger (2740 PINs) than the iOS blacklist. The blacklists
were constructed using the 27 and 2740 most frequently
occurring PINs in the Amitay-4-digit dataset, and we refer
to them as DD-4-digit-27 and DD-4-digit-2740. When com-
paring these two data-driven blacklists and the one used in
iOS, it can be seen that they have different compositions.
While 22, i.e., 82 % of the PINs contained in DD-4-digit-
27 are blacklisted in iOS, there are also 5 PINs which are
not. Surprisingly, these PINs correspond to simple patterns
like 0852 which is a bottom-up pattern across the PIN pad
or 1379, the four corners of the pad chosen in a left-to-right
manner. Similar observations can be made when comparing the
iOS and the large DD-4-2740 blacklist. Of 274 PINs which are
rejected by iOS, 258, i.e., 92 %, are also blocked by our large
data-driven blacklist. The remaining 16 PINs all follow the
same repetitive aabb scheme, e.g., 0033, 4433, or 9955.
Interestingly, only one of those PINs, 9933, was selected in
our study which shows that double repetitions are presumably
not as common as Apple expects.
C. Recruitment and Demographics
Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), we recruited a
total of 1452 participants. After excluding a portion due to
invalid responses to attention tests or survey errors, we had
1220 participants remaining. We required our participants to
be 18 years or older, reside in the US (as checked by MTurk),
TABLE III
OVERVIEW OF STUDIED TREATMENTS.
Treatment Short Blacklist Size Click-thr.
4
di
gi
ts
Control-4-digit Con-4 − − −
Placebo-4-digit Pla-4 First choice 1 7
iOS-4-digit-wCt iOS-4-wC iOS 4-digit 274 3
iOS-4-digit-nCt iOS-4-nC iOS 4-digit 274 7
DD-4-digit-27 DD-4-27 Top Amitay 27 7
DD-4-digit-2740 DD-4-2740 Top Amitay 2740 7
6
di
gi
ts Control-6-digit Con-6 − − −
Placebo-6-digit Pla-6 First choice 1 7
iOS-6-digit-wCt iOS-6-wC iOS 6-digit 2910 3
and have at least an 85 % approval rate on MTurk. The IRB
approval required focusing on participants residing in the US,
but there may be a secondary benefit to this: US residents
often do not have chip-and-PIN credit cards (although, they
do use 4-digit ATM PINs), in contrast to residents in Europe or
Asia, and thus may associate PIN selection more strongly with
mobile device locking. In any case, participants were explicitly
primed for the mobile device unlock setting. Participants
indicated they understood this instruction, and their qualitative
responses confirm that this was indeed the case.
We also reviewed all of the participants’ responses for
consistency, including answers to attention check questions,
the honesty question, and speed of entry. We removed 12 who
provided inconsistent data but did not “reject” any participants
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were compensated
with $ 1 (USD) for completion; the survey took on average
5 minutes for an hourly rate of $ 12.
a) Demographics and Background: As typical on
MTurk, our sample is relatively young and better educated than
the general US population. Of the participants, 619 identified
as male (51%) while 590 (48%) identified as female (1 %
identified as other or preferred not to say), and the plurality
of our participants were between 25 and 34 years old (47 %).
Most participants had some college (23 %) or a bachelor’s
TABLE IV
USAGE OF MOBILE UNLOCK AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES.
Primary Scheme No. % Secondary Scheme No. %
Fingerprint 573 47 %
4-digit PIN 285 50 %
6-digit PIN 148 26 %
Pattern 84 14 %
Other 56 10 %
Face 162 13 %
4-digit PIN 82 51 %
6-digit PIN 50 31 %
Pattern 15 9 %
Other 15 9 %
Other Biometric 24 2 %
4-digit PIN 5 21 %
6-digit PIN 3 13 %
Pattern 14 58 %
Other 2 8 %
4-digit PIN 165 14 %
6-digit PIN 37 3 %
Pattern 60 5 % No secondary scheme used.
Other 59 5 %
None 140 11 %
degree (39 %), and few (12 %) had a master’s or doctoral
degree. While 26 % described having a technical background,
71 % described not having one. We have the full details of the
demographics responses in Appendix B in Table IX.
b) Smartphone OS: We asked participants which oper-
ating system they use on their primary smartphone. Slightly
more than half, 698 (57 %), of the participants were Android
users, while 506 (42 %) were iOS users. We collected browser
user-agent strings during the survey, and confirmed similar
breakdowns, suggesting most participants used their primary
smartphone to take the survey. A detailed breakdown can be
found in the Appendix C in Table X.
c) Unlock Schemes Usage: As we focus on mobile
authentication, we were interested in learning about the kind
of mobile authentication our participants use, recalling both
biometric and knowledge-based authentication may be in use
on a single device. We first asked if a biometric was used and
then asked what authentication participants use instead or as
a backup for the biometric, e.g., when it fails. While Table IV
shows a compressed description, a detailed breakdown can be
found in the Appendix C in Table X. For knowledge-based
authenticators, considered here, PINs are the most common:
44 % described using a 4-digit PIN, 20 % using a 6-digit PIN,
and 3 % using a PIN longer than 6 digits. The second most
common form of knowledge-based authentication are Android
unlock patterns at 14 %, and 44 participants (or 4 %) reported
using an alphanumeric password. In our study, 140 participants
reported not using any locking method.
D. Ethical Considerations
All of the survey material and protocol was approved by
our Institutional Review Board (IRB). Beyond meeting the
approval of our institution, we worked to uphold the ethical
principles outlined in the Menlo Report [43].
In practicing respect for persons and justice, beyond in-
forming and getting consent, we also sought to compensate
participants fairly at least at the minimum wage of the munic-
ipality where the oversight was performed. Since some of our
treatments may frustrate participants, e.g., where the blacklist
was quite large (DD-4-digit-2740), we also compensated those
who returned the survey and notified us of their frustration.
Additionally, as we are dealing with authentication informa-
tion, we evaluated the ethics of collecting PINs and distributing
blacklists in terms of beneficence. With respect to collecting
PINs, there is risk in that participants may (and likely will)
expose PINs used in actual authentication. However, there is
limited to no risk in that exposure due to the fact that PINs
are not linked to participants and thus cannot be used in a
targeted attack. A targeted attack would need proximity and
awareness of the victim, of which, neither is the case for this
study. Meanwhile, the benefit of the research is high in that
the goal of this research is to improve the security of mobile
authentication. Similarly, distributing blacklists increases so-
cial good and scientific understanding with minimal risk as a
determined attacker likely already has access to this material.
Finally, we have described our procedures transparently and
make our methods available when considering respect for law
and public interest. We also do not access any information
that is not already publicly available.
E. Limitations
There are a number of limitations in this study. Foremost
among them is the fact that the participant sample is skewed
towards mostly younger users residing in the US. However, as
we described previously, there may be some benefit to studying
PINs from US residents as they are less familiar with chip-
and-PIN systems and may be more likely to associate PINs
directly with mobile unlocking. We argue that our sample
provides realizable and generalizable results regarding the
larger ecosystem of PIN selection for mobile authentication.
Further research would be needed to understand how more
age-diverse [31] and location-diverse populations select PINs.
Another limitation of the survey is that we are asking
participants to select PINs while primed for mobile authen-
tication and there is a risk that participants do not act the
same way in the wild. We note that similar priming is used in
the authentication literature for both text-based passwords for
desktop [41], [40] and mobile settings [28], and these results
generalize when compared to passwords from leaked password
datasets [42]. We have similar results here. When compared
to the most realistic dataset previously available, Amitay-4-
digit, the most common 4-digit PINs collected in our study
are also present in similar distributions to Amitay [2]. Also, in
analyzing the qualitative data, a number of participants noted
that they used their real unlock PINs.
While this presents strong evidence of the effectiveness
of mobile unlock priming, we, unfortunately, do not have
any true comparison points, like what is available for text-
based passwords. There is no obvious analog to the kinds of
attacks that have exposed millions of text-based passwords
that would similarly leak millions of mobile unlock PINs.
Given the available evidence, we argue that collecting PINs
primed for mobile unlock authentication provides a reasonable
approximation for how users choose PINs in the wild.
Due to the short, online nature of our study, we are limited in
what we can conclude about the memorability of the PINs. The
entirety of the study is only around 5 minutes, while mobile
authentication PINs are used for indefinite periods, and likely
carried from one device to the next. There are clear differences
in these cases, and while we report on the recall rates within
the context of the study, these results do not generalize.
Finally, we limited the warning messaging used when
a blacklist event occurred. We made this choice based on
evaluating the messaging as used by iOS, but there is a long
line of research in appropriate security messaging [38], [1],
[15], [18]. We do not wish to make claims about the quality
of this messaging, and a limitation of this study (and an area of
future work) is to understand how messaging affects changing
strategies and click-through rates.
V. PIN SELECTION ON SMARTPHONES
In the following section, we discuss the security of both 4-
and 6-digit PINs. Unless otherwise stated, our analyzed dataset
consists of the PINs entered before any blacklist warning in
Step (5) of the study. These so-called “first choice” PINs (cf.
Table VI) are unaffected by the blacklists.
A. Strength of 4- and 6-digit PINs
a) Entropy-Based Strength Metrics: We analyzed PINs
in terms of their mathematical metrics for guessing resistance
based on entropy estimations. For this, we consider a perfect
knowledge attacker who always guesses correctly (in perfect
order) as described by Bonneau et al. [10]. The advantage of
such an entropy estimation approach is that it always models a
best-case attacker and does not introduce bias from a specific
guessing approach. Our results are given in Table V.
We report the β-success-rate, which measures the expected
guessing success for a throttled adversary limited to β-guesses
per account (e.g., λ3 = 3 guesses). Moreover, we provide the
Min-entropy H∞ as a lower bound estimate that solely relies
on the frequency of the most common PIN (1234, 123456).
Finally, we present the partial guessing entropy (α-guesswork)
Gα, which provides an estimate for an unthrottled attacker
trying to guess a fraction α of all PINs in the dataset. In three
cases, the calculation of G˜0.2 is based on PINs occurring only
once, due to the small size of the datasets. This constraint
would result in inaccurate guessing-entropy values which is
why they are not reported.
For a fair comparison among the datasets which all differ
in size, we downsampled First-4, Amit-4, Rock-4, and Rock-
6 to the size of the smallest dataset First-6 (369 PINs) in
our calculations. We repeated this process 500 times, removed
outliers using Tukey fences with k = 1.5. In Table V we report
the median values.
The low Min-entropy of the Rock-6 dataset is due to the
fact that the PIN 123456 is over-represented. It is 21×
more frequent than the second-most popular PIN. In contrast,
the most common 4-digit PIN occurs only 1.7× more often,
leading to a lower H∞ value.
TABLE V
GUESSING DIFFICULTY FOR A PERFECT-KNOWLEDGE ATTACKER.
Online Guessing (Success %) Offline Guessing (bits)
Dataset λ3 λ10 λ30 H∞ G˜0.05 G˜0.1 G˜0.2
First-4† 3.79 % 7.86 % 16.80 % 5.72 6.60 7.11 -?
Amit-4† 9.49 % 16.26 % 26.29 % 4.53 4.74 5.16 6.33
Rock-4† 8.67 % 18.70 % 32.79 % 4.72 4.94 5.23 5.81
First-6 6.23 % 10.30 % 15.72 % 4.53 5.19 6.57 -?
Rock-6† 13.28 % 16.53 % 21.95 % 3.10 3.10 3.07 -?
†: For a fair comparison we downsampled the datasets to the size of First-6 (369 PINs).
?: We omit entries which are not sufficiently supported by the underlying data.
Overall, the PINs we collected, specifically primed for
mobile authentication, have different (and stronger) strength
estimations than PINs derived from leaked text-based pass-
word datasets studied in the previous work. This is true for
both the 4- and 6-digit PINs, which supports our motivation
for conducting studies that collect PINs directly.
b) Guess Number-Driven Strength Estimates: Next, we
estimate the security of the PINs in regard to real-world
guessing attacks. For this, we consider an attacker as described
in Section III-A. Our attacker guesses PINs in decreasing
probability order based on the Amit-4, Rock-4, and Rock-6
datasets. When two or more PINs share the same frequency,
i.e., it is not possible to directly determine a guessing order,
Golla et al. [16] suggests ordering those PINs using a Markov
model. We trained our model on the bi-grams (4-digit PINs)
or tri-grams (6-digit PINs) of the respective attacking datasets
which simulates the attacker with the highest success rate for
each case without overfitting the problem.
An overview of our guessing analysis can be found in
Figure 6. In the throttled scenario, depicted in Figure 6(a), we
find attacking 4-digit PINs with the Amitay-4-digit dataset (4)
is more effective than using RockYou-4-digit (5). We simu-
late the stronger attacker by utilizing the Amitay dataset in
subsequent strength estimations of 4-digit PINs.
When comparing 4- (4) and 6-digit PINs (×), we see that
guessing performance varies. For 10 guesses (the maximum
allowed under iOS), we find 4.6 % of the 4-digit and 6.5 % of
the 6-digit PINs are guessed. For 30 guesses (a less determined
attacker on Android), 7.6 % of the 4-digit and 8.9 % of the 6-
digit PINs are guessed and for 100 guesses (a reasonable upper
bound on Android), 16.2 % of the 4-digit and 13.3 % of the
6-digit PINs.
Somewhat counter-intuitive is the weaker security for 6-digit
PINs for the first 40 guesses. Upon investigation, the most-
common 6-digit PINs are more narrowly distributed than their
most-common 4-digit counterparts. The most common 6-digit
PINs consist of simple PINs, such as 123456 as defined in
Table XII in Appendix E, and repeating digits. In contrast, the
most common 4-digit PINs consist of simple PINs, patterns,
dates, and repeating digits. As a result, the most common 6-
digit PINs may actually be easier to guess and less diverse
than the most common 4-digit PINs.
There could be many explanations for this counter-intuitive
finding. One explanation may be that users have more 4-digit
PIN sequences to draw on in choosing a PIN, such as dates,
but have fewer natural 6-digit analogs, and thus revert to less
diverse, more easily guessed choices. Another explanation may
be that users have a false sense of security that comes with
6-digit PINs as they are “two digits more secure” than 4-digit
PINs. Thus, users do not feel that they need more complexity
in their 6-digit PIN choices. Either way, future research is
needed to better understand this phenomenon, which has also
been observed by Aviv et al. [6] in the context of increasing
the size (4x4 vs. 3x3) of Android graphical unlock patterns.
Finally, we compare guessing resistance with other mobile
authentication schemes including Android’s graphical unlock
patterns drawn on a 3x3 grid () and alphanumeric passwords
(F), along with a uniform distribution of 3-digit PINs (–).
In theory, a 3x3 grid allows 389 112 unique patterns, yet,
the distribution of patterns is highly skewed [39]. When
considering an attack throttled to 100 guesses, 35.5 % of the
patterns will be guessed. Against this attack, 4- and 6-digit
PINs are twice as good. Password-based authentication, on
the other hand, is the most secure scheme. After 100 guesses
only 1.9 % of the passwords are recovered.
Figure 6(b) shows the guessing time of an attacker due to
rate limiting based on Table II for iOS and Android. iOS has
stricter rate limiting with a maximum of 10 guesses that can be
completed in 1h 36m, at which point an attacker compromises
4.6 % of the 4-digit PINs and 6.5 % of the 6-digit PINs. At
the same time limit of roughly 1.5 h, an attacker on Android
is able to compromise 13.6 % of the 4-digit PINs and 11.7 %
of the 6-digit PINs because of less restrictive rate limiting.
Especially on iOS, rate limiting becomes more aggressive
after the initial guesses. For example, the first 6 guesses on
iOS can be done within a minute, while the first 8 guesses
already take 21 minutes. An attacker with only one minute
on iOS is able to compromise 3.5 % of the 4-digit PINs and
6.2 % of the 6-digit PINs. But there are only marginal gains
for 10 guesses which take 1h 36m on iOS with 4.6 % of the
4-digit PINs and 6.5 % of 6-digit PINs compromised. Hence,
after the first minute with 6 guesses on iOS, it does not greatly
benefit the attacker to continue through the aggressive timeouts
for 4 more guesses at 1h 36m. In contrast, an attacker on
Android would benefit more from continuing to guess beyond
the initial large increases in rate limiting. Of course, in a
targeted attack setting, there may be additional information
or other motivations for the attacker not modeled here.
To summarize, in line with previous work from Wang et
al. [46], we found no evidence that 6-digit PINs offer any
security advantage over 4-digit PINs considering a throttled
guessing attacker, which is the relevant threat model for mobile
unlock authentication. To support this claim, we performed
χ2 tests (α = 0.05) for both the 4- and 6-digit PINs
guessed within 10 [4.6 %, 6.5 %], 30 [7.6 %, 8.9 %], and
100 guesses [16.2 %, 13.3 %]. Neither the test for 10 guesses
showed a significant difference (p = 0.16) in PIN strength,
nor the tests for 30 (p = 0.44) or 100 guesses (p = 0.19).
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(b) Guessing performance against 4- and 6-digit PINs on Android and iOS
based on the required time. For 4-digit PINs, we only show the success
rate of an attack with Amit-4 as it outperforms Rock-4 (cf. Figure 6(a)).
Fig. 6. Guessing performance of a throttled attacker. The figure on the top is
based on the number of guesses. The bottom figure is based on the required
time and considers the different rate limits of Android and iOS (cf. Table II).
B. Selection Strategies
In Step (6) of our study, we asked participants about their
“strategy for choosing” their PIN. We analyzed the free-text
responses to this question by building a codebook from a
random sample of 200 PIN selection strategies using two
coders. Inter-rater reliability between the coders measured by
Cohen’s kappa was κ = 0.92. The 10 most popular strategies
are shown in Appendix E in Table XII. We found no difference
in the top 5 selection strategies between 4- and 6-digit PINs.
While the set of selection strategies is diverse, we found
that many of the participants chose their PINs based on dates,
especially birthdays and anniversaries. Followed by that are
PINs that were perceived memorable by participants who
have selected something “easy to remember.” Also popular are
patterns on the PIN pad and PINs that have some meaning to
the participants like a partial ZIP code or a favorite number.
TABLE VI
SECURITY METRICS AND CREATION TIMES FOR PINS CONSIDERING DIFFERENT DATASETS AND TREATMENTS.
Blacklist 10 Guesses 30 Guesses 100 Guesses Guess No. Creation Entry Number of
Name Participants Hits No. % No. % No. % Median Time Time Attempts
D
at
as
et
s First-Choice-4-digit 851 - 39 5 % 65 8 % 138 16 % 1 330 - - -
Clicked-through-4 19 19 5 26 % 6 32 % 13 68 % 50 - - -
Control-4-digit 231 - 11 5 % 19 8 % 39 17 % 1 185 7.9 s 1.48 s 1.01
Tr
ea
tm
en
ts
Placebo-4-digit 122 122 5 4 % 11 9 % 19 16 % 2 423 21.8 s 1.52 s 2.15
iOS-4-digit-wCt 124 28 5 4 % 8 6 % 18 15 % 1 405 10.4 s 1.36 s 1.17
iOS-4-digit-nCt 126 21 4 3 % 10 8 % 14 11 % 1 747 9.3 s 1.58 s 1.29
DD-4-digit-27 121 5 4 3 % 7 6 % 18 15 % 1 928 8.8 s 1.47 s 1.11
DD-4-digit-2740 127 88 0 0 % 0 0 % 1 1 % 2 871 25.4 s 1.55 s 2.98
D
at
as
et
s First-Choice-6-digit 369 - 24 7 % 33 9 % 49 13 % 39 389 - - -
Clicked-through-6 10 10 9 90 % 9 90 % 9 90 % 1 - - -
Tr
ea
tm
en
ts Control-6-digit 127 - 7 6 % 12 9 % 18 14 % 36 822 11.5 s 2.52 s 1.01
Placebo-6-digit 117 117 3 3 % 6 5 % 10 9 % 154 521 28.5 s 2.98 s 2.17
iOS-6-digit-wCt 125 15 9 7 % 9 7 % 13 10 % 40 972 11.9 s 2.56 s 1.06
VI. BLACKLISTS AND PIN SELECTION
We now present results on our 7 blacklist treatments: 5
treatments for 4-digit PINs and 2 treatments for 6-digit PINs
as shown in Table VI.
A. Attacker’s Knowledge of Blacklists
As described in Section III-A, we assume the attacker knows
which blacklisting strategy is used by the system and can
optimize the guessing strategy by not guessing items on the
blacklist. Here, we consider how much benefit this optimiza-
tion provides. Table VII shows the net gains and losses for
guessing PINs when considering a blacklist-informed attacker.
Knowledge of the blacklist is unhelpful when considering
the placebo (Pla-4 and Pla-6) and the click-through treatments
(iOS-4-wC and iOS-6-wC). The blacklist is effectively of
size one for the placebo as the first choice of a participant
is dynamically blacklisted. Merely knowing that a PIN was
blocked is of little help to the attacker. As there is no clear
gain (or harm), we model a blacklist-knowledgeable attacker
for the placebo treatments (see Table VI).
The case with a non-enforcing blacklist where users can
click through the warning message is more subtle. If the
attacker is explicitly choosing not to consider PINs on the
blacklist, even though they may actually be selected due to
non-enforcement, the guessing strategy is harmed (negative in
Table VII). None of the tested modifications of this strategy,
e.g. by incorporating the observed click-through rate, lead to
an improvement. As such, we consider an attacker that does
not use the blacklist to change their guessing strategy for the
click-through treatments (iOS-4-wC and iOS-6-wC). In the
remaining treatments (iOS-4-nC, DD-4-27, DD-4-2740), there
are clear advantages when knowing the blacklist.
B. Blacklisting Impact on Security
We now consider how the different blacklists perform
in terms of improving security. The primary results are in
Table VI where we report on the guessing performance against
each treatment. As described in Section III-A, there are certain
rate limits implemented on Android and iOS which is why
we report on throttled attacks with 10, 30, and 100 guesses in
TABLE VII
ATTACKER’S GAIN FROM BLACKLIST KNOWLEDGE.
10 Guesses 30 Guesses 100 Guesses Guess No. Knowledge
Treatment No. % No. % No. % Median Beneficial
Pla-4 ±0 ±0 % ±0 ±0 % ±0 ±0 % ±0 –
iOS-4-wC -3 -2 % -4 -2 % -9 -8 % -303 7
iOS-4-nC +3 +2 % +7 +6 % +3 +2 % +245 3
DD-4-27 +4 +3 % +7 +6 % +5 +4 % +27 3
DD-4-2740 ±0 ±0 % ±0 ±0 % +1 +1 % +2740 3
Pla-6 ±0 ±0 % ±0 ±0 % ±0 ±0 % ±0 –
iOS-6-wC -9 -7 % -5 -4 % -8 -6 % -7322 7
terms of the number and percentage of correctly guessed PINs
(No. and % columns). In addition, we provide the attacker’s
performance in an unthrottled setting based on the median
guess number. The 4-digit attacker is informed by the Amit-4
dataset, while the 6-digit attacker employs the Rock-6 dataset.
Both attackers guess in frequency order with knowledge of the
blacklist where appropriate (see Section VI-A).
We performed a multivariant χ2 test comparison (α = 0.05)
for the PINs guessed within 10, 30, and 100 guesses across
treatments. The test for 10 and 30 guesses did not show any
significant difference (p = 0.21 and p = 0.10); the test for
100 guesses did (p < 0.01), as described below.
a) Smaller Blacklists: In the throttled setting with
100 guesses, there is little difference among iOS-4-digit-
wCt (15 %), iOS-4-digit-nCt (11 %), DD-4-digit-27 (15 %),
Placebo-4-digit (16 %), compared to Control-4-digit (17 %)
and First-Choice-4-digit (16 %). Our post-hoc analyses
(Bonferroni-corrected for multiple testing) results support this,
as we found no significant difference between the smaller
blacklists. It is therefore hard to justify the combination of
throttling and small blacklists, especially as blacklist warnings
are associated with negative sentiments (see Section VI-F).
In the unthrottled setting, though, we see some differences
between the smaller and placebo blacklist cases. Notably, the
smallest blacklist (DD-4-digit-27) outperforms the 10× larger
iOS blacklist (iOS-4-digit-nCt). We conjecture this may be
due to iOS’ inclusion of PINs based on repetitions which
were chosen less often by our participants. As a result, in
an unthrottled setting, blacklisting can offer real benefits. The
median guess numbers for both 4- and 6-digit placebos suggest
that just pushing users away from their first choice can improve
security. Unfortunately, direct use of a placebo blacklist is
unlikely to be effective and is problematic in practice as users
will quickly figure out the deception.
Finally, we reiterate that these improvements to the unthrot-
tled attack setting appear to be only of academic interest: given
the small key space, it is reasonable to assume that all possible
combinations can be exhaustively tested within minutes [33].
b) Large Blacklist: We also consider a very large black-
list in the DD-4-digit-2740 treatment containing 2740 PINs,
10× bigger than the 4-digit iOS blacklist and blocking 27.4 %
of the key space. At this scale, we do see noticeable effects
on security in the throttled setting. Even after 100 guesses,
the attacker finds only 1 % of 4-digit PINs. Our χ2 tests
support this, for 100 guesses we found a significant difference
(p < 0.01). For post-hoc analyses (Bonferroni-corrected) we
found a significant difference between the large DD-4-2740
blacklist and Con-6 (p < 0.01) as well as all other 4-digit
treatments: Con-4 (p < 0.001), Pla-4 (p < 0.01), iOS-4-wC
(p < 0.01), iOS-4-nC (p < 0.05), and DD-4-27 (p < 0.01).
This suggests that a larger blacklist can improve security in a
throttled setting.
While similar positive security results are present for the
unthrottled setting, we show in Section VI-E that the larger
blacklist also leads to a perceived lower usability, and thus it
is important to balance the user experience with security gains.
c) Correctly Sizing a Blacklist: While there is a clear
benefit to having a large blacklist, it is important to consider
the right size of a blacklist to counteract negative usability
and user experience issues. This leads to the question: Can a
smaller blacklist provide similar benefits in the throttled setting
and if so, what is an appropriately sized blacklist?
Data from the DD-4-digit-2740 treatment enables us to
simulate how users would have responded to shorter blacklists.
In our user study, we collected not only the final PIN accepted
by the system, but also all n − 1 intermediate (first-choice,
second-choice, and so on) PINs rejected due to the blacklist.
Consider a smaller blacklist that would have permitted choice
n − 1 to be the final PIN, rather than n. To simulate that
smaller blacklist size, we use choice n− 1.
The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 7. We
observe that there are several troughs and peaks in the curves.
We speculate that these relate to changes in user choices as
they move from their first choice PIN to their second choice
PIN, and so on due to the expanding blacklist restrictions.
For example, entering the first trough, the attacker is most
disadvantaged when it is no longer possible to rely on guessing
only first choice PINs and second choice PINs need to be
considered. Eventually, the blacklist has restricted all first
choice PINs, whereby the attacker can now take advantage
of guessing popular second choices which results in a peak.
These cycles continue until the blacklist gets so large that few
acceptable PINs remain, and the attacker’s advantage grows
steadily by guessing the remaining PINs not on the blacklist.
Based on these cycles, we conclude that an appropriately-
sized blacklist should be based on one of the troughs where
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Fig. 7. Blacklist size recommendation: For throttled attackers, limited to
100 guesses, a blacklist of ∼10% of the key space (∼1150 PINs) is ideal.
an attacker is most disadvantaged to maximize the security
gained in the throttled setting. As we are also concerned about
minimizing user discomfort and frustration (e.g, PIN creation
time, see Table VI), the first trough appears the most ideal,
which occurs at about 10 % of the 4-digit PIN space throttled
at 100 guesses. We expect similar results for 6-digit blacklists
as well, but we do not have sufficient examples of selected 6-
digit PINs to perform the same analysis. Future research would
be needed to confirm this. However, as 4-digit PINs are still
exceedingly common, this result provides important insight to
developers to improve user selection of 4-digit PINs.
C. Enforcing the Blacklist
In the 4-digit case, we compared the enforcing (iOS-4-digit-
nCt) with the non-enforcing (iOS-4-digit-wCt) blacklist and
found that enabling a click-through option does not show
significant security differences. This suggests that using a
click-through option does not reduce security in the throttled
attacker setting despite the fact that clicked-through PINs are
extremely weak (see row Clicked-through-4 in Table VI).
These results seem to be driven by the fact that it is
uncertain whether the user clicked through (see Table VII).
In an enforcing setting, the attacker can leverage the blacklist
but is equally challenged in guessing the remaining PINs.
We also investigated why participants chose to ignore and
click through the warning messages. From the 28 participants
who saw a blacklist warning in the iOS-4-wC treatment, we
observed a click-through-rate (CTR) of 68 % (19 participants).
In the respective 6-digit treatment iOS-6-wC, 10 out of 15, i.e.,
67 %, ignored the warning. This is twice the rate at which TLS
warnings are ignored (∼ 30%) [37].
Furthermore, we asked the 29 participants who pressed
“Use Anyway” about their motivations. The 3 most observed
answers are Memorability Issues: “Because this is the number
I can remember,” Incomplete Threat Models: “Many people
don’t tend to try the obvious PIN as they think it’s too obvious
so people won’t use it,” and Indifference: “I don’t give [sic]
about the warning. Security is overrated.” These findings are
similar to prior work where users do not follow external
guidance for a number of reasons [26], [48], [34].
Treatment Security Memorability Convenience
Con-4 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Pla-4 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
iOS-4-nC 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
iOS-4-wC 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
DD-4-27 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
DD-4-2740 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Con-6 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Pla-6 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
iOS-6-wC
0 20 40 60 80 100
Secure Somew.
secure
Neither Somew.
insecure
Insecure
0 20 40 60 80 100
Easy
to rmb.
Somew.
easy
Neither Somew.
hard
Difficult
to rmb.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Easy to
enter
Somew.
easy
Neither Somew.
hard
Difficult
to enter
Fig. 8. Participants’ perception of their PIN’s security (Secure – Insecure), memorability (Easy to remember – Difficult to remember), and convenience (Easy
to enter – Difficult to enter).
In older versions of iOS, the blacklist warning message
was “Are You Sure You Want to Use This PIN? This PIN
is commonly used and can be easily guessed.” with the safe
option “Choose New PIN” (bold) and the unsafe click-through
option saying “Use PIN.” We observed that Apple changed
this wording with iOS 11 to what is depicted in Figure 4.
Considering that TLS warning design research started with
similarly high CTRs of around 70 % [1], we hope that new
designs can also improve blacklist warning CTRs [37].
D. PIN Changing Strategies
In our study, we asked 367 participants who faced a blacklist
how their creation strategy changed in response to the warning.
We sampled 126 responses (10 % of our total number of par-
ticipants) and grouped them into three categories: participants
who continued using the “Same” strategy, participants who
made “Minor” changes to the strategy, and participants who
came up with a completely “New” strategy. Examples for
those cases can be found in the Appendix E in Table XIII.
Two coders independently coded the data. Inter-rater reliability
between the coders measured by Cohen’s kappa was κ = 0.96.
The results are shown in Table VIII.
About 50 % of the participants choose a new strategy when
confronted with a blacklist warning. Only participants of the
DD-4-27 treatment with a very small blacklist, tended to keep
their pre-warning strategy. The edit distances vary slightly
across the treatments and support this self-reported behavior:
participants in the 4-digit scenario changed on average 3 digits
with the standard deviation showing that some participants
changed their PIN completely while some participants only
changed 2 digits. The same conclusion can be drawn from the
edit distances in the 6-digit case.
E. User Perception
We analyzed participants’ perceptions regarding PIN selec-
tions with respect to security and usability. Participants were
asked to complete the phrase “I feel the PIN I chose is”
with three different adjectives: “secure, memorable, and conve-
nient.” The phrases were displayed randomly and participants
responded using a Likert scale. The results are shown in Figure
8. To compare these results, we converted the Likert responses
into weighted averages on a scale of -2 to +2. As the weighted
TABLE VIII
PARTICIPANTS’ PIN CHANGING.
Selection vs. Changing Strategy Edit Distance
Treatment Hits Sample Same Minor New Mean SD
Pla-4 122 29 10 7 12 3.20 0.90
iOS-4-wC 9? 9 0 4 5 3.11 0.87
iOS-4-nC 21 21 4 6 11 3.24 0.92
DD-4-27 5 5 2 2 1 3.20 0.75
DD-4-2740 88 29 4 7 18 3.39 0.76
Pla-6 117 28 8 5 15 4.59 1.41
iOS-6-wC 5? 5 0 2 3 4.40 1.20
?: Hit blacklist, and did not click-through.
averages are not normally distributed, tested using the Shapiro-
Wilk test (p < 0.001), we tested for initial differences using a
Mann-Whitney U test, followed with post-hoc, pair-wise tests
using Dunn’s-test comparisons of independent samples with a
Bonferroni correction.
We found that there are significant differences across treat-
ments when considering Likert responses for security. Post-
hoc analysis indicates that the presence of a blacklist for 4-
digit PINs increases the security perception of the final PIN
selected. This is supported by considering the 4-digit placebo
treatment (Pla-4) compared to the 4-digit control (Con-4).
In the placebo treatment, every participant interacted with
a blacklist, and there is a significant increase in security
perceptions (p < 0.01). We see similar differences for the large
blacklist treatment DD-4-2740 (p < 0.001), where again, a
large portion (70 %) of participants encountered the blacklist.
We did not see significant differences for 6-digit PIN users
after encountering the blacklist. This may be because there is
a pre-existing notion that 6-digit PINs are secure.
For memorability we also found significant differences
among the treatments. In post-hoc analysis we found that
increased interaction with the blacklist led to lower perceived
memorability of PINs, as evidenced by the Pla-4 (p < 0.001),
DD-4-2740 (p < 0.001), and the Pla-6 (p < 0.01) treatments
compared to their respective control treatments. The DD-4-
2740 showed the most significant differences with other treat-
ments, likely due to the fact that many participants encountered
the blacklist for multiple PIN choices and thus were relying on
not just second-choice PINs, but also third- and fourth-choice,
etc. PINs that are perceived to be less memorable.
Group Sentiment
Experienced vs. Imagined Blacklist
Experienced 0 20 40 60 80 100
Imagined 0 20 40 60 80 100
PIN Length
Pla-4 0 20 40 60 80 100
Pla-6 0 20 40 60 80 100
Non-Enforcing vs. Enforcing
iOS-4-wC 0 20 40 60 80 100
iOS-4-nC 0 20 40 60 80 100
Blacklist Size
Pla-4 0 20 40 60 80 100
iOS-4-nC 0 20 40 60 80 100
DD-4-2740
0 20 40 60 80 100
Negative Neutral Positive
Fig. 9. Participants’ sentiment: We split the participants into four categories
and classified their feelings in terms of sentiment using EmoLex [29].
The responses to perceived convenience also show signifi-
cant differences, however, post-hoc analysis revealed limited
effects when considering pair-wise comparisons. In general,
participants perceived their 4-digit PINs at the same conve-
nience level across treatments. While we did not see a signif-
icant difference between convenience levels between 4- and
6-digit PINs, the perceived convenience of 6-digit PINs may
be precarious because we observed a significant difference
(p < 0.01) between the 6-digit placebo and control treatments.
This suggests that while a user may be comfortable with
their first-choice 6-digit PIN, there is much higher perceived
inconvenience for their second-choice 6-digit PIN.
F. User Sentiment
To gain insight into participants’ sentiments regarding
blacklisting, we asked “Please describe three general feelings
or reactions that you had after you received this warning
message” or “would have had” if the participant did not
encounter a blacklist. Accompanying the prompt are three
free-form, short text fields. A codebook was constructed by
two individual coders summarized in Appendix D in Table
XI. For each of the four categories (blacklist hit experienced
vs. imagined, 4- vs. 6-digit PINs, non-enforcing vs. enforc-
ing, different blacklist sizes), 21 individuals’ responses were
randomly selected. Again, two individual raters were tasked
with coding the responses. The inter-rater reliability, computed
using Cohen’s kappa, was κ = 0.91.
Using the NRC Word-Emotion Association Lexicon [29],
we classified assigned codes in terms of sentiment (positive,
negative, or neutral) for Figure 9. EmoLex maps individual
English words (in this case, codes assigned by our coders) to
exactly one sentiment. For example, “indifference,” is labeled
with the “negative” sentiment. As expected, participants gener-
ally had a negative reaction to the blacklist warning message.
While overall, participants expressed negative sentiments
towards blacklist messages, which may be expected as warning
messages are not often well received by users [1], we only
observed significant differences in a single comparison.
Using a χ2 test, we found that there was significant differ-
ence (p < 0.05) in the proportion of negative sentiment when
considering PIN length for the two placebo treatments. As both
groups always experienced a blacklist event, a higher negative
sentiment exists for the placebo blacklist with 4-digits. This
might be because users were confused and angered by the
warning as the blacklist event was arbitrary. However, in the
6-digit PIN case, less familiarity with 6-digit PINs may have
led to less negative reactions.
Interestingly, participants in general consider displaying
warnings about weak PIN choices to be appropriate although
they cannot imagine that their own choice might be considered
insecure. Moreover, sentiments are similar for those who
hit the blacklist and those who imagined having done so.
This suggests that future research on blacklist warning design
may benefit from simply asking participants to imagine such
events.
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper presents the first comprehensive study of PIN
security as primed for the smartphone unlock setting. In the
smartphone unlock setting, developers have adopted notable
countermeasures—throttling, blacklisting, PIN length—which
we consider as part of our analysis. Using a throttled attacker
model, we find that 6-digit PINs offer little to no advantage,
and sometimes make matters worse. Also, blacklists would
have to be far larger than those in use on today’s mobile
operating systems to affect security.
Given this information, we offer a number of recommenda-
tions to mobile developers.
• In a throttled scenario, simply increasing the PIN length
is of little benefit. In our results, there was no significant
difference between 4- and 6-digit PINs within the first
100 guesses. To justify the adoption of longer PINs,
developers should carefully articulate an alternative threat
model. Observe that without throttling, an attacker could
quickly try all 4- and 6-digit PINs.
• On iOS, with only 10 possible guesses, we could not ob-
serve any security benefits when a blacklist is deployed,
either for 4- or 6-digit PINs. On Android, where 100
guesses are feasible, we find that a blacklist would be
beneficial for 4-digit PINs. However, such a blacklist
would need to contain roughly 10% of the PIN space
which is much more than currently deployed blacklists.
More research is needed to test the effectiveness of
blacklists for 6-digit PINs.
• We observe that the perceived convenience is lower
when users are forced to select a second 6-digit PIN
as compared to selecting a second 4-digit PIN (as was
the case in the placebo treatments). This may suggest
users are less familiar with selecting 6-digit PINs, but
the reasons for this are left to future investigation.
• While we observed advantages for using a placebo black-
list in the unthrottled settings, we do not recommend
implementing a placebo blacklist, as users will simply
game it once the deception is known.
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APPENDIX
A. Survey Instrument
Questions for participants who hit the blacklist.
We noticed that you received the following warning while choosing your PIN:
[A screenshot of the same warning message that the participant saw during
the study.]
People use different strategies for choosing their PINs. Below, we will ask
about your strategy.
1) Prior to seeing the warning above, what was your strategy for choosing
your PIN?
Answer:
2) After receiving the warning message, please describe how or if your
strategy changed when choosing your PIN.
Answer:
The “Extra” question was only asked if the participant had the option
to ignore the warning and did so by clicking “Use Anyway.”
(Extra) You selected “Use Anyway” when choosing your final PIN. Please
describe why you did not change your final PIN after seeing this
warning message.
Answer:
3) Please describe three general feelings or reactions that you had after
you received this warning message.
Feeling 1: Feeling 2: Feeling 3:
Please select the answer choice that most closely matches how you feel about
the following statements:
4) My initial PIN creation strategy caused the display of this warning.
◦ Strongly agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neutral ◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly Disagree
Questions for participants who did not hit the blacklist.
People use different strategies for choosing their PINs. Below, we will ask
about your strategy.
1) What was your strategy for choosing your PIN?
Answer:
Imagine you received the following warning message after choosing
your PIN:
[A screenshot of the warning message as in Figure 4 or Figure 5.]
2) Please describe how or if your strategy would change as a result of the
message.
Answer:
3) Please describe three general feelings or reactions that you would have
had after you received this warning message.
Feeling 1: Feeling 2: Feeling 3:
Please select the answer choice that most closely matches how you feel about
the following statements:
4) My PIN creation strategy would cause this warning message to appear.
◦ Strongly agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neutral ◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly Disagree
From now on all participants saw the same questions.
5) It is appropriate for smartphones to display warning messages about
PIN security.
◦ Strongly agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neutral ◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly Disagree
Please select the answer choice that most closely matches how you feel about
the following statements referring to the final PIN you chose:
The order of questions 6, 7, and 9 was chosen randomly for
each participant. The attention check question was always the
8th question.
6) I feel the PIN I chose is:
◦ Secure ◦ Somewhat secure ◦ Neither easy nor insecure ◦ Somewhat
insecure ◦ Insecure
7) I feel the PIN I chose is:
◦ Easy to remember ◦ Somewhat easy to remember ◦ Neither easy
nor hard to remember ◦ Somewhat hard to remember ◦ Difficult to
remember
8) What is the shape of a red ball?
◦ Red ◦ Blue ◦ Square ◦ Round
9) I feel the PIN I chose is:
◦ Easy to enter ◦ Somewhat easy to enter ◦ Neither easy nor hard to
enter ◦ Somewhat hard to enter ◦ Difficult to enter
10) What is your age range?
◦ 18-24 ◦ 25-34 ◦ 35-44 ◦ 45-54 ◦ 55-64 ◦ 65-74 ◦ 75 or older
◦ Prefer not to say
11) With what gender do you identify?
◦ Male ◦ Female ◦ Non-Binary ◦ Other ◦ Prefer not to say
12) What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
◦ Some high school ◦ High school ◦ Some college ◦ Trade, technical, or
vocational training ◦ Associate’s Degree ◦ Bachelor’s Degree ◦Master’s
Degree ◦ Professional Degree ◦ Doctorate ◦ Prefer not to say
13) Do you use any of the following biometrics to unlock your primary
smartphone? (Select all that apply)
 Fingerprint  Face  Iris  Other biometric  I do not use a
biometric  I do not use a smartphone  Prefer not to say
If the participant stated they use a biometric in question 13:
14A) How do you unlock your smartphone, if your biometric fails or when
you reboot your primary smartphone?
◦ None ◦ Pattern ◦ 4-digit PIN ◦ 6-digit PIN ◦ PIN of other length
◦ Alphanumeric password ◦ I use an unlock method not listed here
◦ I do not use a smartphone ◦ Prefer not to say
If the participant stated they do not use a biometric in question 13:
(14B) What screen lock do you use to unlock your primary smartphone?
◦ None ◦ Pattern ◦ 4-digit PIN ◦ 6-digit PIN ◦ PIN of other length
◦ Alphanumeric password ◦ I use an unlock method not listed here
◦ I do not use a smartphone ◦ Prefer not to say
15) What is the operating system of your primary smartphone?
◦ Android ◦ iOS (iPhone) ◦ Other ◦ I do not use a smartphone
◦ Prefer not to say
16) Which of the following best describes your educational background or
job field?
◦ I have an education in, or work in, the field of computer science,
computer engineering or IT.
◦ I do not have an education in, nor do I work in, the field of computer
science, computer engineering or IT.
◦ Prefer not to say to say
17) Please indicate if you have honestly participated in this survey and
followed instructions completely. You will not be penalized/rejected for
indicating ’No’ but your data may not be included in the analysis:
◦ Yes ◦ No
18) Please feel free to provide any final feedback you may have in the field
below.
Answer:
B. Demographics
TABLE IX
OVERALL DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE PARTICIPANTS. FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY, WE GROUPED ANSWERS FOR Non-Binary, Other, AND Prefer not to say
UNDER Other.
Male Female Other Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
What is your age range? 619 51 % 590 48 % 11 1 % 1220 100 %
18–24 85 7 % 76 6 % 4 0 % 165 13 %
25–34 309 25 % 267 22 % 4 0 % 580 47 %
35–44 147 12 % 145 12 % 2 0 % 294 24 %
45–54 56 5 % 63 5 % 0 0 % 119 10 %
55–64 16 1 % 35 3 % 0 0 % 51 4 %
65–74 6 1 % 4 0 % 0 0 % 10 1 %
Prefer not to say 0 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 % 1 0 %
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? 619 51 % 590 48 % 11 1 % 1220 100 %
Some High School 2 0 % 3 0 % 0 0 % 5 0 %
High School 63 5 % 52 4 % 2 0 % 117 10 %
Some College 154 13 % 116 10 % 5 0 % 275 23 %
Training 23 2 % 23 2 % 0 0 % 46 4 %
Associates 63 5 % 82 7 % 1 0 % 146 12 %
Bachelor’s 236 19 % 235 19 % 2 0 % 473 39 %
Master’s 54 5 % 66 5 % 0 0 % 120 9 %
Professional 11 1 % 4 0 % 0 0 % 15 1 %
Doctorate 12 1 % 9 1 % 0 0 % 21 2 %
Prefer not to say 1 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 % 2 0 %
Which of the following best describes your educational background or job field? 619 51 % 590 48 % 11 1 % 1220 100 %
Tech 231 30 % 83 7 % 3 0 % 317 26 %
No Tech 368 19 % 491 40 % 7 1 % 866 71 %
Prefer not to say 20 2 % 16 1 % 1 0 % 37 3 %
C. Device Usage
TABLE X
ANSWERS OF PARTICIPANTS REGARDING THEIR DEVICE USAGE. NOTE, FOR THE BIOMETRICS QUESTION, PARTICIPANTS SELECTED ALL THAT APPLY.
FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY, WE GROUPED ANSWERS FOR Non-Binary, Other, AND Prefer not to say UNDER Other.
Male Female Other Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Do you use any of the following biometrics to unlock your primary smartphone? 619 51 % 590 48 % 11 1 % 1220 100 %
Fingerprint 329 27 % 310 25 % 7 1 % 646 53 %
Face 95 8 % 67 5 % 0 0 % 162 13 %
Iris 24 2 % 11 1 % 0 0 % 35 3 %
Other Biometric 13 1 % 15 1 % 0 0 % 28 2 %
No Biometric 209 17 % 206 17 % 3 0 % 418 34 %
No Smartphone 1 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 %
Prefer not to say 19 2 % 22 2 % 1 0 % 42 3 %
How do you unlock your smartphone, if your biometric fails or when you reboot your primary smartphone? 390 51 % 362 48 % 7 1 % 759 100 %
None 2 0 % 5 1 % 0 0 % 7 1 %
Pattern 65 8 % 48 6 % 0 0 % 113 15 %
4-digit PIN 183 24 % 186 25 % 3 0 % 372 49 %
6-digit PIN 98 13 % 99 13 % 4 1 % 201 26 %
PIN of other length 12 2 % 10 1 % 0 0 % 22 3 %
Alphanumeric 21 3 % 11 2 % 0 0 % 32 4 %
Other method 6 1 % 2 0 % 0 0 % 8 1 %
No smartphone 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Prefer not to say 3 0 % 1 0 % 0 0 % 4 1 %
What screen lock do you use to unlock your primary smartphone? 229 50 % 228 50 % 4 0 % 461 100 %
None 58 13 % 82 18 % 0 0 % 140 30 %
Pattern 36 8 % 23 5 % 1 0 % 60 13 %
4-digit PIN 83 18 % 81 18 % 1 0 % 165 36 %
6-digit PIN 20 4 % 17 4 % 0 0 % 37 8 %
PIN of other length 6 1 % 2 1 % 0 0 % 8 2 %
Alphanumeric 6 1 % 6 1 % 0 0 % 12 3 %
Other method 7 2 % 4 1 % 0 0 % 11 2 %
No smartphone 0 0 % 1 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 %
Prefer not to say 13 3 % 12 2 % 2 1 % 27 6 %
What is the operating system of your primary smartphone? 619 51 % 590 48 % 11 1 % 1220 100 %
Android 382 31 % 310 25 % 6 1 % 698 57 %
iOS 232 19 % 270 22 % 4 1 % 506 42 %
Other 1 0 % 4 0 % 0 0 % 5 0 %
No smartphone 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Prefer not to say 4 1 % 6 1 % 1 0 % 11 1 %
D. Feelings and Sentiments
TABLE XI
AS PART OF OUR QUESTIONNAIRE, WE ASKED PARTICIPANTS FOR 3 FEELINGS ABOUT THE BLACKLIST WARNING. WE CODED AND ANALYZED THESE
FEELINGS FROM A SAMPLE OF 130 PARTICIPANTS THAT ENCOUNTERED A BLACKLIST. WE ALSO INCLUDED 21 PARTICIPANTS THAT ONLY IMAGINED
HITTING A BLACKLIST. BELOW, WE LIST THE TOP 20 REPORTED FEELINGS. TWO CODERS INDEPENDENTLY CODED THE DATA AND THE LEVEL OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CODERS, MEASURED BY COHEN’S KAPPA WAS κ = 0.91. QUESTION: “Please describe three general feelings or reactions that
you had after you received this warning message.” OR “Please describe three general feelings or reactions that you would have had after you received this
warning message.”
Code Name Frequency Sample from the Study Sentiment
Annoyance 92 “Annoyed by this message.” Negative
Frustrated 45 “This message frustrates me.” Negative
Worried 41 “I am worried about my PIN’s security.” Negative
Indifference 34 “Don’t care about this message.” Negative
Surprised 32 “Surprised to see this message.” Neutral
Fear 32 “Afraid of attackers.” Negative
Doubt 32 “I distrust the veracity of this message.” Negative
Thinking 31 “Thinking about my PIN’s security.” Neutral
Acceptance 27 “I agree with this message.” Positive
Compelling 26 “Motivated to change my PIN.” Positive
Cautious 26 “Cautious about my PIN.” Positive
Confusion 22 “This message is confusing.” Negative
Happy 19 “Happy my PIN will be stronger.” Positive
Shame 18 “Ashamed my PIN wasn’t strong.” Negative
Remember 13 “I might forget my PIN.” Neutral
Angry 13 “Angry this message appeared.” Negative
Curiosity 12 “I wonder why this message appeared.” Positive
Alert 10 “I’m now more aware.” Neutral
Safe 8 “Confident this PIN will be safe.” Positive
Sadness 7 “Sad this message appeared.” Negative
E. PIN Selection and Changing Strategies
TABLE XII
WE CODED AND ANALYZED A SAMPLE OF 200 PIN SELECTION STRATEGIES. BELOW, WE LIST THE TOP 10 SELECTION STRATEGIES. TWO CODERS
INDEPENDENTLY CODED THE DATA. THE LEVEL OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE CODERS, MEASURED BY COHEN’S KAPPA, WAS κ = 0.92. QUESTION:
“People use different strategies for choosing their PINs. Below, we will ask about your strategy. What was your strategy for choosing your PIN?”
Code Name Frequency Description Example PIN Sample from the Study
Date 59 Special date like anniversary, birthday, graduation day 1987 / 112518 “A date I won’t forget.”
Memorable 37 Memorability was the main concern 2827 / 777888 “A number easy to remember.”
Pattern 24 Visualized a pattern on the PIN pad 2580 / 137955 “The numbers on how they appeared on the PIN pad.”
Meaning 20 Personal meaning; Familiar or significant number 6767 / 769339 “I chose my favorite numbers and used them repeatedly.”
Random 14 Randomly chosen digits 4619 / 568421 “Random numbers that do not repeat.”
Reuse 12 Reused PIN from a different device/service 0596 / 260771 “The one I normally use.”
Word 9 Textonyms; Converted a word to a number 2539 / 567326 “Dog name.”
Simple 9 Simplistic, comfortable, easy 0000 / 123987 “To just chose an easy PIN.”
System 8 User’s established systematic strategy 0433 / 041512 “I used the numbers from the current time 04:33 PM.”
Phone 3 (Partial) phone number 1601 / 407437 “I used the first four digits of a friend’s phone number.”
TABLE XIII
WE CODED AND ANALYZED A SAMPLE OF 126 PIN CHANGING STRATEGIES OF PARTICIPANTS THAT ENCOUNTERED A BLACKLIST AND IN RESPONSE
CHANGED THEIR PIN. BELOW WE LIST AND EXPLAIN OUR CODES. TWO CODERS INDEPENDENTLY CODED THE DATA. THE LEVEL OF AGREEMENT
AMONG THE CODERS, MEASURED BY COHEN’S KAPPA WAS κ = 0.96. QUESTION: “After receiving the warning message, please describe how or if your
strategy changed when choosing your PIN.”
Code Name Frequency Description Use Case Strategy Sample from the Study
Same 28 Same strategy for both Selection Date “Birthday of relative.”Change Date “Chose another birthday.”
Minor 33 Slight modification of strategy Selection Meaning “It’s one I remember, a number with personal significance.”Change Meaning++ “I changed one number in the sequence to get the app to accept it.”
New 65 New strategy that is different Selection Date “I used my girlfriend’s birthday.”Change Phone “I changed my strategy to a memorable phone number’s last 4 digits.”
